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Abstract 
While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions 
are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is 
fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change.  In 
the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic 
interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across 
multiple coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates greater generation of non-excludable 
public goods, but may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach 
to governance.  Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition 
governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and are robust 
under diverse conditions of excludability, congestability of the non-excludable public good, and 
arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single 
coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of 
returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic 
model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation 
by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of 
enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative 
forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes.    
1. Introduction 
In cooperation dilemmas, approaches to governance commonly face trade-offs alternatively between 
fragility and depth, and scope and participation (in other words, choosing between a weak agreement 
that includes everyone, or a strong agreement with holdouts or defections).[1] The 2015 Paris 
Agreement on climate change is an example that sought to overcome these trade-offs resulting from 
substantial heterogeneity in the national interests of participant countries, and its success or failure 
may clarify the potential for coalition-structure to sustain contributions to public goods.[2] The Paris 
Agreement relies on sovereign mitigation pledges and a periodic “global stocktake” intended to 
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“ratchet” cooperation,[3–5] allowing for voluntary contributions to be deepened incrementally. The 
Agreement also embraced a role for overlapping coalitions of non-Party stakeholders, including cities, 
regions, businesses, and other non-state actors,[6] in facilitating the attainment of global objectives. 
This proliferation of cooperative arrangements with variable participation and scope – alternately 
conceived as building blocks[7] or polycentricity[8] – calls into question the view of these approaches 
as inferior to the “first-best approach”[9] of a self-enforcing agreement with universal participation 
that dis-incentivizes free-riding[10] and also captures emissions leakage.[11] Can these principles be 
applied to the overall sustainability of public- and common-goods provisioning? 
Whereas single coalitions can be stable and cooperative, held together by spillovers such as learning 
from early experiences and technology sharing, or by side payments that balance the valuation of 
different members and change participation dynamics for others,[12,13] multiple coalitions in a single 
realm of governance can also be beneficial.[14] The multiple, overlapping cooperative forums 
characterizing polycentricity can be more productive for cooperative outcomes than politically 
attainable comprehensive regimes.[15–19] The work by Hannam et al.[19] has shown, based on case 
studies, that polycentricity can deepen international cooperation. In their model, the authors study a 
particular game that describes collectively the examples they consider. The model includes two 
different levels of impure public-good provision: coalition co-benefits and direct co-benefits to 
contribution. Here, we take their control system – of a growing voluntary coalition with differentiated 
structures – and show simultaneously that polycentricity can be applied to a much broader class of 
problems – not just public goods but also common goods and any group interactions – and that its 
effects are stemming from improvements to lack of information and not just from a small group size 
effect or direct co-benefits to cooperation.  
Polycentric governance is not a panacea but has promising features. If, on the one hand, polycetricity 
may increase the influence of cooperators,[20] on the other, the same might be said for defectors, 
except that in practice such cooperative arrangements are constructed as “coalitions of the willing”. 
Mechanisms such as reciprocity – either direct, where cooperation is expected to be retributed, or 
indirect, where cooperation is expected to boost reputation – create more favourable outcomes for 
cooperative endeavours,[21–28] including by allowing social norms[29] and fairness[30] to evolve. 
These approaches produce a plethora of setups and solutions for overcoming free-riding in collective-
action problems. 
Different coalition structures, ranging from polycentrism to a single coalition, alter the conditions 
under which individuals interact with others in groups. However, coalition structures and their 
dynamics remain under-examined in the science of cooperation and world politics on issues as diverse 
as trade, human rights, and security[2,31], and even less explored in the governance of commons. 
Under which conditions coalition structures can be applied to a generality of cases is an important 
unresolved question that is urgent to answer, especially in the context of global climatic change. 
Experimentation is revealing that coalition-based and polycentric approaches can show substantial 
value for governing short-lived climate pollutants,[32,33] protecting fisheries,[34] and managing 
forest resources.[35,36] Improved theories for the origin of these advantages can inform future 
governance-of-commons challenges. 
Using a combination of best-response analysis, typical of game theory, and myopic response, typical 
of evolutionary-game-theoretic (EGT) approaches, the model presented here focuses on cooperation 
in different coalition structures within a complex dynamical system to reveal basic insights about the 
behaviour of coalitions in the generation of General Public Goods (GPGs). Best responders[37] have 
full information about the game they are playing and can compute the outcome of a hypothetical 
change in strategy, the so-called marginal gains from switching strategy. On the contrary, myopic 
responders[38] have no access to the game they are playing and base their response on the outcome 
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of different behaviours they observe. We start with a game-theoretical analysis of marginal gains from 
switching between different strategies, an ideal type of strategic profile representing informed players 
(though still boundedly rational, without perfect foresight of future preferences).[39] We then follow 
by describing another stylized-type: individuals that have no information about the game and can only 
access the outcomes of their and others’ current experience. The latter situation of “uninformed” 
players intuitively leads to less cooperative behaviour, even in conditions that should be favourable 
to it. We show that constraining the size of each coalition relative to the total coalition engagement 
– creating multiple overlapping coalitions – enables “uninformed” players to recognize marginal 
gains of cooperation, such that they attain cooperative outcomes similar to those of the “informed” 
players.  In other words, myopic players respond as best-responders, even if they do not directly 
access the game they are playing. The finding resonates with fundamental insights regarding why 
regimes are sought in international politics and suggests that further study of coalition-structured 
governance and polycentricity could be advantageous for sustaining cooperation in a range of issues, 
including climate change. We finish discussing the key assumptions that allow this analysis and drive 
the results, providing additional context in which we expect the general results to hold in the real 
world.  
2. Model 
We consider a population of size 𝑍 representing the relevant actors of the system and 
potential members of coalitions. By forming a coalition, players can produce a public good 
with a specified degree of excludability. We do not assume coalitions to be cooperative. 
Players chose alternatively to be members of the coalitions, M – who either cooperate, C, or 
defect, D – or outsiders, O. The lack of punishment mechanisms purposefully creates a 
difficulty for cooperation. The coalitions are represented as contribution games in which 
members interact in (sub-)groups of size 𝑁 to obtain some benefit, 𝐵(𝐶), that depends on the 
total contribution of each coalition, 𝐶. In games of loss, the benefit is often thought of as the 
loss that is not created, which, in reality, can be hard for the players to grasp. Our first strong 
assumption relies on considering that, at any given time, all existing coalitions have the same 
size and that the functional form 𝐵(𝐶) is the same for all coalitions. Members contribute to 
the coalition, 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0, which conceptually mimics potential running costs and signals shared 
goals. Cs additionally contribute a given amount, 𝑐, to the game considered to be the cost of 
cooperation, whereas Ds make no other contributions. A fraction, 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1, of the benefit 
produced is shared exclusively among Ms, creating a so-called club good[40] and making Ds 
the free riders. The remaining fraction, 1 − 𝑒, spills over to everyone, including outsiders, 
making it a public good. This parameter controls the extent to which the GPG can be 
privatized to the coalition. The model leaves out the institutional mechanisms of forum 
shopping and advocacy networks, and it is also comprised of homogeneous players, each 
with equal weight, so that there is no potential for a large player to nucleate or enforce 
cooperation (i.e., as a hegemon might do in international politics). Where the model could be 
conceived in terms of relations between cities, nations, and even aggregations such as the 
EU, we presume each entity makes decisions on its own accord, with no homophily.[41] 
There is no perception of a collective goal among players[42], and action is based on return 
on contribution, not on reciprocation or retaliation of others’ actions;[43,44] only the 
unconditional pursuit of self-interest in each discrete time-step, with no foresight of the future 
or memory of past interactions. Even where there are gains to full cooperation, there is no 
capacity for ex-ante coordinated action, including in small groups. There is no potential for 
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collective punishment or enforcement in the model, either among the players or externally 
imposed.  Incorporating those mechanisms would each conduct to further and more stable 
cooperation in the structured games presented here.[16,17,45] The goal of our model is to 
show that allowing for coalitions with overlapping membership is on its own a positive 
mechanism for sustainability of cooperation under minimal information. 
3. Informed players  
We start by assessing a game of “informed players”, who have complete information of the 
game and, hence, by definition, can compute payoffs using different behaviours and choose 
their approach strategically (even if without foresight). These players are able to compute 
their payoff and a hypothetical payoff with an alternative strategy. In Figure 1 we specify 
six different states representing possible individual perceptions of the game at any given 
point, resulting from combinations of the shape of the benefit generated by total contribution, 
𝐵(𝐶), and three effective game parameters: coalition member share, 𝜀1 ≡ 𝑒 𝑁
𝜃′⁄ ; public-
good spillover, 𝜀2; and relative cost of engagement, 𝜅 (see Methods for extended parameter 
description). Figure 1 includes representations of marginal gains from switching from 
strategy 𝑌 to 𝑋, ΔΠ𝑋𝑌. In the decision-making, the relative cost of coalition engagement 𝜅 is 
judged against the relative benefit, 𝑏 ≡ 𝐵 𝑐⁄ , whereas the cost of cooperation is judged 
against the marginal return on investment, 𝑅(𝐶′) ≡ 𝑏(𝐶′ + 𝑐) − 𝑏(𝐶′), for a fixed 
contribution of the remaining players, 𝐶′. To tend toward a cooperative state, A, players need 
both i) high marginal returns on investment, 𝑅 > 1 (𝜀1 + 𝜀2)⁄ , and ii) sufficiently high gains 
from coalition engagement, 𝑏𝜀1 > (1 − 𝑅𝜀2 + 𝜅). This means that even if the coalition 
provides large benefits, with max 𝑏 > (1 + 𝜅) 𝜀1⁄ , in which case condition ii) is fulfilled, the 
ratio at which the benefit is produced per unit of investment is crucial for sustaining 
cooperative coalitions.   
For a typical sigmoidal growing function for 𝑏(𝐶), we can reproduce general and well-known 
results. Starting with a large and highly cooperative coalition, if max 𝑏 ≡ 𝑏(𝐶max
′ ) is high 
enough, outsiders will join. However, for very high levels of cooperation, typically the 
variation of 𝑏 is small and new members join as defectors while cooperators are likely to stop 
contributing, state B. If contributions decrease, but 𝑏 is still sufficiently high, marginal 
returns on cooperation increase, which leads to a stable large coalition, creating a dynamic 
balance between states A and B.  Complementarily, as the coalition grows, member share 𝜀1 
decreases, effectively reducing the balance 𝜀1𝑏, which leads to lessened cooperation and, 
consequently, reduced total benefit produced and appeal of the coalition, leading to one of 
the remaining scenarios, C to E. We expect state A, even if stable, to reach a dynamic 
equilibrium with other states. Therefore, as a consequence of the assumption that benefits to 
contribution present decreasing returns for high contributions, even the most successful 
coalitions tend to have non-universal engagement and must tolerate free riders. These results 
are not new, but their application to our model of GPG is essential for comparison with a 
situation in which players cannot access the value of the return to their contributions. 
The second crucial assumption of our model is that players are entirely consistent in their 
strategy across different coalitions. Reputational gains and trust-building are examples of 
mechanisms that create a tendency for decisions being taken by an actor in one set of 
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coalitions to have a bearing for similar actions in other coalitions[46] – e.g., interests shaped 
in one coalition transfer to another. Overall, considering they use the same strategy in all 
coalitions, in models with informed players, cooperation increases with 〈𝑅〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) − 1 and 
coalition engagement with either 〈𝑏〉𝜀1 − 𝜅 (for Ds) or 〈𝑏〉𝜀1 − 𝜅 + 〈𝑅〉𝜀2 − 1 (for Cs), where 
〈∙〉 represents average values. These conditions, leading to the possibility of stable 
cooperation, form the basis of our comparison of models with different coalition structures 
in the remainder of the paper. 
 
Figure 1. Possible states within the dynamic system, computed for informed players. Depending on the 
total contribution of the other players, 𝐶′, an informed player faces different scenarios depending on the game 
parameters. On the top right, we consider the marginal gains from switching between each pair of strategies 
given by ΔΠ𝑋𝑌 ≡ Π𝑋 − Π𝑌, where Π𝑋 are given in Eqs.(3). Here, we set 𝑏(𝐶
′) ≡ 𝐵(𝐶′) 𝑐⁄ ; 𝑅(𝐶′) ≡
𝑏(𝐶′ + 𝑐) − 𝑏(𝐶′) ≈ 𝐵′(𝐶′), representing the marginal return per unit of investment; 𝜀1 ≅ 𝑒 𝑁
𝜃′⁄ ; 𝜀2 ≡
(1 − 𝑒) 𝑍𝜃⁄ ; and 𝜅 ≡ 𝑐𝑐 𝑐⁄ . Parameters 𝜃 and 𝜃
′ control congestability of the public and club goods. The sign 
of each of these three quantities controls the direction of its respective arrow in the states represented.  
4. Uninformed players and the mitigating impacts of coalition structure 
In contrast to the assumption that players have complete information about their options, 
individuals in cooperation dilemmas often must make decisions without complete knowledge 
of the game.  The same is true of nations with incomplete knowledge of the interests and 
strategies of others during complex negotiations.[47] As before, actors cannot act 
“strategically”, i.e., they do not anticipate the (re)action of others.[48]  Contrary to the 
previous section, we now consider the extreme case in which information is absent, and 
individuals rely on theirs and others’ experiences to make decisions.  This assumption is a 
substantial simplification of the recognition in theory of world politics that information 
imperfections and high transaction costs motivate governments to create international 
regimes.[49] To show that polycentricity offers additional information, we compare two 
scenarios in which “uninformed individuals”, by definition, use the average payoff of players 
with a given behaviour to evaluate the performance of that behaviour. Then, we manipulate 
the structure of interactions without affecting the source of information. This model of 
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behavioural change is inspired in works in evolutionary game theory applied to social 
contexts,[29,50,51] where individuals use social learning[52] to adopt the currently best 
strategy in their neighbourhood of influence. In our model, contrary to the standard literature 
in EGT, the structure of interactions is not limited to a fixed group size. Importantly, the 
interactions can occur between a fraction of the population that scales with the population 
size – for instance, when the whole population is engaged in a single interaction. As we will 
show, this means that the result that Nash equilibria are necessarily equilibria of this 
evolutionary dynamics no longer hold.[53,54] Accordingly, we develop a model where 
interaction structure can change over time with changes in behaviour. Two factors determine 
the dynamics : i) Average cooperative behaviour within coalitions changes depending on the 
difference in the average payoff of Cs and Ds; and ii) the average payoff of those members 
relative to the average payoff of Outsiders governs the change in the number of coalition 
members. Considering this interpretation, our results can be compared with the analysis in 
the previous section.  
We are interested in studying the effect of overlapping coalitions, rather than a single 
coalition, which requires the typical coalition size to be smaller than the number of members. 
For this purpose, we use an exogenously determined shape that both constrains the growth 
of any coalition and leads to coalition proliferation.[19] In Figure 2A we show how 𝑁(𝑦) is 
an increasing function of the fraction of members in the population, 𝑦, which allows for the 
continuous growth of the typical coalition size as more individuals engage in coalitions 
(either as Cs or Ds). If 𝛼 = 1, then the coalition size is simply the number of players engaged 
in coalitions (i.e., there is only one coalition). However, for any larger value of 𝛼, the 
coalition size is bound to be smaller, until there is universal participation when 𝑦 approaches 
1. 
  
Figure 2. Operationalization and effect of structuring cooperation in overlapping coalitions. Panel A 
shows how coalitions grow and proliferate in the dynamic system; for any fraction of members in the population, 
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y, increasing 𝛼 constrains the size of the typical coalition.[19] Panel B shows the distribution (mean ± standard 
deviation) of the engagement in any coalition, y, and share of those coalition members who interact 
cooperatively, x. Increasing 𝛼 results in both higher levels of coalition engagement, and in greater cooperation 
within coalitions.  Panels C, D, and E, further demonstrate the dynamic benefit for cooperation with increasing 
values of 𝛼, for a specific (sigmoidal) choice of the benefit function. They represent the most likely direction 
of evolution of the system with warmer colors representing faster rates of evolution whereas the background 
shadow represents the regions where the system spends more time. These results (panels B-E) indicate that 
increasing parameter 𝛼 enables player with limited knowledge of the game to better recognize potential gains 
of cooperation.  Notice that in C., even though the system spends most time near the O vertex, the vertex is 
unstable due to exogenous factors introduced (see below), creating a cyclic dynamic. In effect, coalition-
structured governance reduces the cost of absence of information, 𝐾. Parameters: 𝑍 = 100, 𝑔𝑚 = 5/𝑍, 𝑒 =
0.5, 𝑐 = 1, 𝑐𝑐 = 1, 𝛽 = 10
−1, 𝜇 = 1 𝑍⁄ , 𝐵(𝐶′) = 100 (𝐹(𝐶′) − 𝐹(0)) (𝐹(𝑁𝑐) − 𝐹(0))⁄ , with 𝐹(𝐶′) =
(1 + 𝑒
100(
𝐶′
𝑁𝑐
−
3
4
)
)
−1
, a sigmoidal function specified here with a sharp threshold at ¾ of the group. In order to 
guarantee the system has no absorbing states, we introduce the possibility for random changes of strategies – 
an added factor of noise or exogenous shocks – by resetting 𝑇𝑋𝑌 =
𝑖𝑋
𝑍
𝑖𝑌
𝑍−1
𝑝(𝑋, 𝑌)(1 − 𝜇) +
𝜇
2
. (See [18,55,56] 
for connection between the arrows indicating the most likely direction of evolution and the prevalence times 
and for details on their computation) 
4.1.  A single coalition (𝛼 = 1) 
The case of a single coalition can be described by setting 𝛼 = 1. It is trivial to show that for 
all shapes of 𝐵 and values of the parameters, the fraction of cooperators always decreases 
leading to the collapse of any “uniformed” coalition. In Figure 2B, the lowest level of 
cooperation happens for 𝛼 = 1, with non-zero values being due to exogenously imposed 
noise perturbing the system. Accordingly, Figure 2C shows the dynamics of this system 
pointing to configurations in which most individuals are Os. Consequently, the probability 
distribution, represented by the shadow background, is also close to that point.  
This proves how a single coalition is very hard to bootstrap with players whose information 
is bounded to their current interactions, resulting in an uncooperative equilibrium even for 
very favourable game conditions with a fully cooperative Nash equilibrium – e.g., a marginal 
return on a unit of contribution much greater than one. This information limitation is a harsh 
scenario and, in reality, players negotiate on the basis of some information – even if scarce, 
uncertain or simply created by analogy with previously known/experienced games or 
dilemmas; for instance, the Kyoto Protocol climate negotiations applied the Montreal 
Protocol model of regime structure, even though the game was different.[10] However, the 
extreme case presented here sets a pessimistic baseline which, as shown below, can be 
improved without adjusting the capabilities of the players in the game.   
4.2.  Multiple coalitions (𝛼 > 1) 
Multiple coalitions allow for experimentation with different actors and under different 
circumstances, which is essential given the complex interests in commons governance 
challenges and uncertainties as to the strategic interests and intentions of other players.  Lack 
of information – or a deluge of it – can hobble recognition of welfare-improving opportunities 
for cooperation. To examine whether coalition-structured governance can overcome the 
disadvantages of the single-coalition case, we constrain the size of coalitions as players 
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become Members, thus creating multiple overlapping coalitions for 𝛼 > 1.  We show that 
this will change the dynamics of coalition engagement and cooperation, all else equal. The 
dynamics of the fraction of cooperators within the coalitions, 𝑥, are still governed by the 
fitness difference between Cs and Ds. That can be expressed in a way similar to what we 
showed for informed players as 
?̇? ∝ 〈𝑅〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) − 1 − 𝐾(𝛼). (1) 
The first two terms correspond to the marginal gains from switching that governed the 
informed dynamics, ΔΠ𝐶𝐷, with 〈𝑅〉 standing as the average return on investment. The last 
term, 𝐾, corresponds to the difference between informed uninformed players and entails an 
effective cost for cooperation that i) exactly cancels the first term – the marginal return on 
investment – when 𝛼 = 1 (the single coalition), 𝐾 = 〈𝑅〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) and ii) vanishes when the 
coalition size is highly constrained, 𝐾 ≪ 〈𝑅〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2). We can interpret 𝐾 as the cost of the 
limitations on information available to Cs, which can be zero in some cases. Looking back 
at our definition of group size constraint, in its essence, the constraint on information is 
controlled by 𝑁 𝑍𝑦⁄ ~𝑦𝛼−1. For high 𝛼, larger values of 𝑦, engagement in coalitions, can be 
attained for which the 𝐾 term remains small, and the lack of information plays a small role. 
This effect is obviously not an effect of small group size, as setting 𝛼 to 1 removes any 
perception of return of contributions, independently of 𝑍 and its consequent 𝑁. Instead, the 
effect is the result of the experimentation with different configurations between updates, 
which is the only way individuals can access more information about the game and the returns 
to contributions. Polycentricity in particular but not exclusively, can achieve such an 
outcome. 
As for the growth of the coalitions, it can be described as 
?̇? ∝ 〈𝑏〉𝜀1 − 𝑥 − 𝜅 (2) 
with 〈𝑏〉 standing as approximately the average relative benefit produced. As we saw for the 
informed case, it is crucial that the benefit being produced is high, which can be directly 
assessed from a comparison between members and non-members. Notice, however, that even 
though the creation of multiple coalitions allows players to access the marginal gains of 
cooperating instead of defecting, it does not provide access to the marginal gain of the non-
excludable part of the benefit produced by joining a coalition, the term containing 𝜀2.  
Going back to Figure 2B, as 𝛼 increases, the cost of lack of information, 𝐾, decreases, which 
induces an internal fixed point with high participation and cooperation. Nonetheless, the 
nature of that fixed point is a complex one. In the bottom panels of Figure 2, we show how, 
for the sigmoidal shape of the benefit 𝐵 with a sharp threshold, the internal fixed point with 
high participation goes from a (stable) spiral, in panel D, to a sink in panel E as 𝛼 grows. 
Different shapes of 𝐵 allow for different classifications of the fixed point, including for its 
stability, but also change the basin of attraction. Notice, additionally, that the slow regions, 
represented with arrows with cooler colours, even if transient in the dynamics, have non-
negligible probability, increasing the variance of the distribution around the fixed points.  
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5. Discussion 
Problems of collective action are more easily overcome in small groups, but effective 
management of common resources frequently requires broad participation. We allow for 
cooperation to emerge through polycentric structures through a control variable that 
determines the rules of coalition size and growth (and consequently coalition proliferation). 
Isolating the effect of this variable, we show that, for a general class of public-goods, higher 
degrees of coalition-based governance not only facilitate greater generation of non-
excludable public goods, but may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, 
and inclusive singular regime. Contrary to any previous study, our results are applicable to 
the whole range of excludability of the public good, congestability of the non-excludable 
public good, and for any shape of the return function, whether it implies a need for behaviour 
coordination, dominance, or an optimal mix.  
The model caricaturises dynamic cooperation dilemmas in the provision of GPGs, with non-
hierarchical actors making decisions that are both normative and selfish in an information-
poor environment. The advantages of increasing multi-coalition regime structure for 
generation of GPGs, relative to fixed coalition size involving the total population are a result 
of minimising the apparent advantage of free-riders (ubiquitous in the provision of GPGs). 
By creating multiple references for cooperative action, the multi-coalition structure, enables 
the recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake.  Indeed, the value of 
regime creation for overcoming the costs of information has long been known in world 
politics; governments create regimes to correct for “market failures” in international 
relations, enabling them to create agreements in their mutual interest. We argue that coalition-
structured governance strengthens the mechanism of information transmission relative to 
inclusive governance approaches, allowing actors to better recognise opportunities for 
cooperative gains. This finding builds on benefits already well understood of cooperation in 
smaller groups, including the development of trust, reciprocity, and ease of enforcement via 
punishment and ostracism.[57–59] These other mechanisms are important, since they may 
help to sustain cooperation once domestic spillovers are exploited, for instance. Additionally, 
we note that the added information created by the coalition-structured governance is reliant 
on a couple of key assumptions we identified in the text. The first is the tendency for players 
to have consistent strategies in different coalitions. We argued that non-modelled reputational 
gains could induce this, but it requires recognition that all coalitions have a common goal 
even if the lines of action are quite distinct. A balance between redundancy and efficiency 
would need to be studied. To some extent, this effect can be rephrased on the ability of players 
to associate actions to an outcome, and that might not be the case if i) the stance of the 
individual players is not public or if ii) the players are involved in coalitions across which 
they have very heterogeneous responses . The second assumption regards the existence of an 
identical game being played by all coalitions. Naturally, the different coalitions could be 
structured to derive co-benefits conditional on overall climate mitigation performance – and 
that would be a policy recommendation for the coalition co-benefit distribution. However, 
we expect heterogeneity in terms of efficiency and that the game being played by each 
coalition to be different. Nonetheless, in an environment where information about the returns 
of investment is scarce, decisions might be made according to an overall perceived benefit, 
which can homogenise the effective games different coalitions play. 
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Defining the conditions under which coalition-based governance may be more effective will 
require further study. This work has suggested additional merits for multi-level governance 
and plurilateral coalitions – for regimes lacking outside external authority, with incomplete 
information, and strong free-riding dynamics. These merits need to be weighted against 
inefficiency costs arising from having multiple coalitions. The interplay between the scale of 
the public good and the scale of the decisions for participation in the governing institutions 
may also play a paramount role that needs further exploration and in-depth analysis, both in 
theoretical and practical settings. Our work is also not intended to suggest that fragmentation 
would benefit cooperation in otherwise functional inclusive regimes.[60] However, the 
multi-coalition structure – mainly the encouragement of initiatives with domestic co-benefits 
– may be the most productive way to “boot-strap” a coalition with broadening participation, 
including for instance the potential for sub-national, national, and regional carbon markets to 
eventually harmonise into a global market, gradually removing inefficiencies once 
behavioural coordination barriers are overcome.[61] Our results suggest that reducing the 
scale at which the coordination game occurs – as with overlapping coalitions – can facilitate 
larger-scale cooperative outcomes.  
Community-based natural resource management are examples of decentralised management 
of public goods.[59] There, the identified need of power transfer to the local institutions and 
of accountable representation could be achieved through this overlapping structure, not only 
by contributing to the management of multiple parcels, in diverse groups, but also by 
involving the local institutions in a panoply of related issues, rather than isolating their 
presumably increased control. Our model suggests that decentralization without overlap may 
not provide enough incentives, especially when information about the resource dynamics - 
and corresponding response to different extracting behaviours – is limited.[59]  
As we have reinforced throughout the text, climate will be a crucial test case. Following 
decades of diplomatic effort, the Paris Agreement has achieved (nearly) full participation by 
being “catalytic and facilitative” of overlapping cooperative arrangements including carbon 
markets and sub-national actions in synergy with country contributions.[6] This structure 
much more closely resembles a multi-coalition regime than a “comprehensive regime” 
structure with uniform rules for all countries that had long been sought as a replacement to 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Nonetheless, key questions remain. Does coalition structured 
governance continue to excel when excludable benefits for cooperators start to run out? Does 
polycentricity still perform better than an inclusive coalition when the largest player in the 
system free-rides across coalitions? We leave these important questions for further study. 
6. Methods 
We consider a population of finite size 𝑍. Players interact in groups/coalitions of size 𝑁 to 
obtain some benefit, 𝐵(𝐶), that depends on the total contribution of each coalition, 𝐶, and 
this dependence is the same for all existing coalitions. Players can adopt one of three 
strategies: cooperate, C, defect, D, or remain outside, O. Cs and Ds contribute to the coalition, 
𝑐𝑐, but Cs contribute an additional amount, 𝑐. A fraction, 𝑒, of the benefit produced is shared 
exclusively among Ms, whereas the remaining fraction, 1 − 𝑒, spills over to everyone, 
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including outsiders. This parameter allows us to interpolate between games with and without 
co-benefits. With this, we can write the payoff of a player with a given strategy when the 
amount contributed by the remaining players in the coalition is 𝐶′: 
Π𝐶(𝐶
′) = 𝐵(𝐶′ + 𝑐) (𝑒
1
𝑁𝜃′
+ (1 − 𝑒)
1
𝑍𝜃
) − 𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐, (3. 1) 
Π𝐷(𝐶
′) = 𝐵(𝐶′) (𝑒
1
𝑁𝜃′
+ (1 − 𝑒)
1
𝑍𝜃
) − 𝑐𝑐, and (3. 2) 
Π𝑂(𝐶
′) = 𝐵(𝐶′) ((1 − 𝑒)
1
𝑍𝜃
) . (3. 3) 
Notice that 𝜃′ and 𝜃, defined between 0 and 1, control the “congestibility” of the good.[62] 
For 𝜃 = 1, the good is fully congestible, meaning the participation of one player reduces the 
spillover produced by the next, a characteristic of common-pool resources; for 𝜃 = 0, there 
is no congestion, which is a common property of air quality and other public goods that spill 
to other players outside of the game. A variation of this model, which studies a particular 
functional form of 𝐵 and type of public good, is discussed in Hannam et al. 2015 but without 
examination of the system dynamics or mechanisms. The group size is set as 𝑁(𝑦) =
𝑍 min{𝑦, 𝑔𝑚 + (1 − 𝑔𝑚)𝑦
𝛼} ≤ 𝑍𝑦, where 𝑔𝑚 is the minimum group size for a single 
coalition before multiple coalitions may form. 
For the evolutionary game, in each time step, we randomly select a player, X, to potentially 
change strategy. Player X randomly selects another player, Y, and compares her own average 
payoff, 𝑓𝑋, obtained in all the coalitions that she is part of, to that of player Y, 𝑓𝑌. With 
probability 𝑝(𝑋, 𝑌) = (1 + 𝑒𝛽(𝑓𝑋−𝑓𝑌))
−1
 player X changes her strategy to that of player Y, 
where 𝛽 controls the intensity of selection or, equivalently, the level of errors/certainty in the 
imitation process. Finally, if we let 𝑖𝐶, 𝑖𝐷, and 𝑖𝑂 be the number of Cs, Ds, and Os, 
respectively, we can set the number of members as 𝑖𝑀 = 𝑖𝐶 + 𝑖𝐷 and use the hypergeometric 
sampling of different coalitions, 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑧, 𝑛, 𝑖) = (
𝑧
𝑛
)
−1
(
𝑖
𝑘
) (
𝑧 − 𝑖
𝑛 − 𝑘
), to write the average 
payoff of each strategy 
𝑓𝐶 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
(4. 1) 
𝑓𝐷 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
(4. 2) 
𝑓𝑂 =
𝑖𝐶
Υ
∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝑂((𝑘 + 1)𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
+
𝑖𝐷
Υ
∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝑂(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
(4. 3)
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With this, one can write the probability that a player with strategy X changes into strategy Y 
as 𝑇𝑋𝑌 =
𝑖𝑋
𝑍
𝑖𝑌
𝑍−1
𝑝(𝑋, 𝑌). Given that we are interested in a scenario in which information is 
scarce, certainty on the payoff difference is likely small, so 𝛽 is small in comparison. In this 
case, one can show that the average fraction of each of the three strategies, 𝑥𝑋 = 𝑖𝑋 𝑍⁄ , 𝑋 =
{𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑂}, can be described by the so-called replicator equation.[56,63] This equation states 
that ?̇?𝑋 = 𝑥𝑋(𝑓𝑋 − 〈𝑓〉), where 〈𝑓〉 = 𝑥𝐶𝑓𝐶 + 𝑥𝐷𝑓𝐷 + 𝑥𝑂𝑓𝑂 is the average payoff of all 
individuals. Therefore, if 𝑦 is the fraction of members, C and D players, in the whole 
population, 𝑦 ≡ 𝑖𝑀 𝑍⁄ , and 𝑥 is the fraction of Cs among those, 𝑥 ≡ 𝑥𝐶 (𝑥𝐶 + 𝑥𝐷)⁄ , we can 
write 
?̇? = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝐷), (5. 1) 
?̇? = 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)(𝑥𝑓𝐶 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑓𝐷 − 𝑓𝑂). (5. 2) 
where 𝑥 describes how cooperative the coalitions are and 𝑦 is a proxy for the maximum size 
of the coalitions. 
6.1. A single coalition (𝛼 = 1) 
In this case, 𝑁(𝑦) = 𝑍𝑦, which simplifies Eqs.(4) and, in turn, Eqs.(5). Given that 
𝑃(𝑘; 𝑍𝑦 − 1, 𝑍𝑦 − 1, 𝑖) = 𝛿𝑘𝑖, the Kronecker delta, 𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝐷 = −𝑐 for all shapes of 𝐵 and 
values of the parameters. Thus, ?̇? < 0 for any fraction of cooperators and, therefore, no 
cooperation, 𝑥 = 0, is the only stable state.  In turn, ?̇? < 0, and, necessarily, (𝑥, 𝑦) = (0,0) 
is the final stable state, in which there is no coalition or contributions.  
6.2.  Multiple coalitions (𝛼 > 1) 
We obtain Eq.(1) by plugging Eq.(4.1) and Eq.(4.2) in Eq.(5.1). We can rearrange the latter 
as ?̇? = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)𝑐(〈𝑅〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) − 1 − 𝐾), with 〈𝑅〉 =
∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑍𝑦 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶) + 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑍𝑦 − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)) 2⁄  𝑅(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0  and  𝐾 represents 
the difference in computed payoff difference between informed and uninformed individuals 
(see supplementary material for details). Finally, Eq.(2) is obtained by plugging Eqs.(4) in 
Eq.(5.2). We rearrange to obtain ?̇? = 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)𝑐(〈𝑏〉𝜀1 − 𝑥 − 𝜅) with 〈𝑏〉 =
𝑥 ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; Υ − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)𝑏(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0 + (1 − 𝑥) ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; Υ − 1, 𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶)𝑏(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0 . 
In models of infinite populations that do not consider outsider and consider groups of finite 
and fixed size which experience all possible configurations, the 𝛫 term is zero, reflecting no 
cost of lack of information (see an illustrative example of such a case in [64]). In this paper, 
however, our control structure allows for coalition that are of a size comparable with that of 
the population. 
6.3.  Code availability 
To generate data for figure 2, the authors used Mathematica’s implementation of Arnoldi’s 
method based on the "ARPACK" library.[65] Code is available from the corresponding 
author on request. 
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Supplementary Material 
Consider a population of size 𝑍. Let 𝑖𝐶  be the number of cooperators (C), 𝑖𝐷 the number of defectors (D), 
𝑖𝑂 the number of outsiders (O) (and the number of member 𝑖𝑀 = 𝑖𝐶 + 𝑖𝐷 = 𝑍 − 𝑖𝑂). With such 
definitions we can set the fraction of members, 𝑦 ≡
𝑖𝐶+𝑖𝐷
𝑍
, and the fraction of cooperators within 
members, 𝑥 ≡
𝑖𝐶
𝑖𝐶+𝑖𝐷
.  
Balance of cooperators. The number of cooperators increases when a defector changes to cooperator, 
(1 − 𝑥) 𝑦 𝑇𝐷→𝐶, or when an outsider becomes a cooperator, (1 − 𝑦)𝑇𝑂→𝐶. It decreases when a 
cooperator changes to D or O, 𝑥 𝑦(𝑇𝐶→𝐷 + 𝑇𝐶→𝑂).  
Balance of defectors. The number of defectors increases when a cooperator changes to defector, 
𝑥 𝑦 𝑇𝐶→𝐷, or when an outsider becomes a defector, (1 − 𝑦)𝑇𝑂→𝐷. It decreases when a defector 
changes to C or O, (1 − 𝑥) 𝑦(𝑇𝐷→𝐶 + 𝑇𝐷→𝑂).  
Balance of outsiders. The number of outsiders increases when a cooperator changes to outsider, 
𝑥 𝑦 𝑇𝐶→𝑂, or when a defector becomes an outsider, (1 − 𝑥)𝑦𝑇𝐷→𝑂. It decreases when an outsider 
changes to C or D, (1 − 𝑦)(𝑇𝑂→𝐶 + 𝑇𝑂→𝐷).  
 
Consider that individuals change strategy when they observe that strategy and then decide based on the 
computation of the payoff difference between the two strategies 
 𝑇𝐷→𝐶 = 𝑦𝑥 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝐷𝐶), 𝑇
𝐶→𝐷 = 𝑦(1 − 𝑥) 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝐶𝐷), 𝑇
𝑂→𝐶 = 𝑦𝑥 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶), 𝑇
𝐶→𝑂 =
(1 − 𝑦) 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂), 𝑇
𝑂→𝐷 = 𝑦(1 − 𝑥) 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝑂𝐷), and 𝑇
𝐷→𝑂 = (1 − 𝑦) 𝐹(𝛽 Δ𝑓𝐷𝑂). 
 
For large populations we can write, 
𝑑(𝑖𝐶/𝑍)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑(𝑥 𝑦)
𝑑𝑡
= (1 − 𝑥) 𝑦 𝑇𝐷→𝐶 + (1 − 𝑦)𝑇𝑂→𝐶 − 𝑥 𝑦(𝑇𝐶→𝐷 + 𝑇𝐶→𝑂) 
𝑑(𝑖𝑂/𝑍)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑(1 −  𝑦)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥 𝑦 𝑇𝐶→𝑂 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑦𝑇𝐷→𝑂 − (1 − 𝑦)(𝑇𝑂→𝐶 + 𝑇𝑂→𝐷) 
Substituting, and linearizing 𝐹(𝑥) ≈ const + 𝑥/2, we get 
𝑑(𝑥 𝑦)
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2
𝑦𝑥((1 − 𝑥) 𝑦  (Δ𝑓𝐷𝐶 − Δ𝑓𝐶𝐷) + (1 − 𝑦) (Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶 − Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂)) 
𝑑(1 −  𝑦)
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2
𝑦 (1 − 𝑦)(𝑥 (Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂 − Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶) + (1 − 𝑥) (Δ𝑓𝐷𝑂 − Δ𝑓𝑂𝐷)) 
Writing for 𝑥 and 𝑦 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2
𝑦 (1 − 𝑦)(𝑥 (Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶 − Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂) + (1 − 𝑥) (Δ𝑓𝑂𝐷 − Δ𝑓𝐷𝑂)) 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2
𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑦 (Δ𝑓𝐷𝐶 − Δ𝑓𝐶𝐷) + (1 − 𝑦)(Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶 − Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂 + Δ𝑓𝐷𝑂 −  Δ𝑓𝑂𝐷)) 
Uninformed individuals 
Individuals in the population interact, and derive an average payoff that depends on the configuration of 
the population, 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), and 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷).  
If individuals do not know what game is being played, they can compare their average payoff, in which 
case, i.e., Δ𝑓𝐴𝐵
no info(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) = 𝑓𝐵(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐴(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑦 (1 − 𝑦)(𝑥 (𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝑂) + (1 − 𝑥) (𝑓𝐷 − 𝑓𝑂)) 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)(𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝐷) 
Informed individuals 
However, if individuals have information about the game they are playing and the configuration of the 
population, they can compute the payoff they will get if they change the strategy, in which case 
Δ𝑓𝐷𝐶
info(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) = 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), Δ𝑓𝐶𝐷
info(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) = 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), 
Δ𝑓𝑂𝐶
info = 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), Δ𝑓𝐶𝑂
info = 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), Δ𝑓𝐷𝑂
info = 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1) −
𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷), Δ𝑓𝑂𝐷
info = 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) 
 
In which case, 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
∝ [𝑥𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + (1 − 𝑥)𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷)]
+ 𝑥(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷)) + (1 − 𝑥) (𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1))⏟                                                 
extra term due to using more information
 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) [𝑦 
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1) + 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷))
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1)
− 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷))] 
 
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) [ 
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1) + 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷))
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1)
− 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷)
+ 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷))] 
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) [ 
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1) + 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷))
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1)
− 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1))] 
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) [ ∑
(𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶) + 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1))
2
(Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)) − 𝑐
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
( ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 , 𝑁[𝑖𝑀 + 1] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)(Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐) − Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐))
𝑁[𝑖𝑀+1]−1
𝑘=0
 
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)(Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐) − Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐))
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶) − 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1))Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1))] 
 
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) [ 〈𝑅[𝑁[𝑖𝑀]]〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2)𝑐 − 𝑐
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
( ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 , 𝑁[𝑖𝑀 + 1] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)(Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐) − Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐))
𝑁[𝑖𝑀+1]−1
𝑘=0
 
− ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐 + 𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐))
+ ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀 − 1], 𝑖𝐶) − 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀 − 1], 𝑖𝐶 − 1))Π𝑂(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀−1]
𝑘=0
)] 
≈ 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)[ 〈𝑅[𝑁[𝑖𝑀]]〉(𝜀1 + 𝜀2)𝑐 − 𝑐] 
 
, with 〈𝑅[𝑁]〉 = ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑍𝑦 − 1,𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶) + 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑍𝑦 − 1,𝑁 − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)) 2⁄  𝑅(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0 . For simplicity, 
in the main text we ignore the terms multiplying the (1 − 𝑦). We consider they are small since the first 
two measure returns of contributions with slightly different configurations, and thus their difference is 
much smaller than the return on contributions, and the last two are returns on cooperation to the 
external public good, which always scales with 1/𝑍𝜃.  
In general, without ignoring any terms, we can write 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷)
+
𝑦 
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1)) +
+(1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1))⏟                                                                  
Κ, extra terms due to using more information ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
And define the difference between informed and uninformed individuals as Κ =
1
2
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) −
𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1)) + (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷) −
(𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷)) − ( 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1))). 
 
Now, since 
𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝑀 − 𝑖𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
,  
𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝑀 − 𝑖𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
, and  
𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝑀 − 𝑖𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 , 𝑁[𝑖𝑀], 𝑖𝐶)Π𝑂(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]
𝑘=0
,  
We can set Κ =
𝐴
2
+ (1 − 𝑦)
1
2
(𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐷), where 
𝐴 = 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1)
= ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶) − 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1))(Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
+ Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)) = ∑ ∇
𝐶𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)(Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐) + Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐))
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
 
𝐵 = 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝑂(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷)
= ∑ (𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀 − 1], 𝑖𝐶) − 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀 − 1], 𝑖𝐶 − 1))Π𝑂(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀−1]
𝑘=0
= ∑ ∇𝐶𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀 − 1], 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝑂(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀−1]
𝑘=0
 
 
𝐶 = 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷 − 1) − 𝑓𝐶(𝑖𝐶 + 1, 𝑖𝐷)
= ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 , 𝑁[𝑖𝑀 + 1] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀+1]−1
𝑘=0
= ∇𝑀 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐶(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
) 
𝐷 = 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 , 𝑖𝐷 + 1) − 𝑓𝐷(𝑖𝐶 − 1, 𝑖𝐷 + 1)
= ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 , 𝑁[𝑖𝑀 + 1] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀+1]−1
𝑘=0
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
+ ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
− ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
= ∇𝑀 ( ∑ 𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
)
+ ∑ ∇𝐶𝑃(𝑘; 𝑖𝑀 − 1,𝑁[𝑖𝑀] − 1, 𝑖𝐶 − 1)Π𝐷(𝑘𝑐)
𝑁[𝑖𝑀]−1
𝑘=0
 
 
 
 Figure S 1 The left and right panels compare the effect of population size as a function of α for configurations in phase space 
that represent the same group size. This shows that the effect of the structure of interaction exists independently of the group 
size. As alpha increases, uninformed populations behave as informed population, being able to access the marginal gains of 
cooperation. In orange we plot ?̇? = 𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝐷 + Κ and in blue ?̇? = (𝑓𝐶 − Κ) − 𝑓𝐷 + Κ = 𝑓𝐶 − 𝑓𝐷. Same parameters as in Figure 2. 
